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VALDEZ V. CITY OF NEW YORK: THE 
“DEATH KNELL” OF MUNICIPAL TORT 
LIABILITY? 
ALISA M. BENINTENDI† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1929, the State of New York purportedly waived its right 
to sovereign immunity from tort liability.1  But, in 2011, the New 
York State Court of Appeals handed down a ruling that 
essentially “tolls the death knell” for tort actions brought against 
a municipality by an individual.2  Despite the passionate 
criticism that the decision has elicited, the judiciary has been 
incapable of either remedying or reducing the decision’s impact 
on this area of law. 
Carmen Valdez, a mother of two young sons, had obtained an 
order of protection against her abusive ex-boyfriend, Felix Perez.3  
A week after taking out the order of protection, Ms. Valdez 
received a telephone call from Perez, in which he threatened to 
kill her.4  Although this was by no means the first threat that 
Ms. Valdez had received from Perez, this escalation of hostility 
prompted her to leave her apartment with her sons in order to 
seek safety at her grandmother’s house.5  Ms. Valdez stopped at a 
pay phone to contact the Domestic Violence Unit at her local 
police precinct, where she had filed for the order of protection, in 
order to alert the unit to this latest threat by Perez.6  Officer 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 
2016, St. John’s University School of Law. I would like to thank Vice Dean Emeritus 
Andrew J. Simons for his guidance with this Note and for being an invaluable 
mentor, as well as my family for their support and encouragement. 
1 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 2015). 
2 Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 92, 960 N.E.2d 356, 373, 936 
N.Y.S.2d 587, 604 (2011) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
3 Id. at 72, 960 N.E.2d at 359, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (majority opinion). 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 72–73, 960 N.E.2d at 359, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 590. 
6 Id. at 73, 960 N.E.2d at 359, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 590. 
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Torres told Ms. Valdez to return to her apartment because Perez 
would be arrested “immediately.”7  Relying upon Officer Torres’s 
promise, she returned to her apartment with her sons.8  The next 
evening, while operating under the mistaken belief that the 
Domestic Violence Unit completed the promised arrest, Ms. 
Valdez took out the garbage.9  Unbeknownst to her, Perez lay in 
wait outside of her door.10  As Ms. Valdez’s children watched 
helplessly, Perez shot their mother in her face and arm before 
taking his own life.11 
In Ms. Valdez’s negligence suit against the City of New York, 
the jury found in her favor,12 but the Court of Appeals ruled that 
her reliance on Officer Torres’s promise was not “justifiable.”13  
The court stressed that Perez first had to be located before the 
promise to arrest him could be fulfilled and that the Domestic 
Violence Unit had not confirmed an arrest at the time of the 
attack.14  The court thus concluded that she had not been 
provided any reason to “relax her vigilance indefinitely.”15  The 
court stated: 
Although, in a colloquial sense, we should be able to depend on 
the police to do what they say they are going to do[,] . . . it does 
not follow that a plaintiff injured by a third party is always 
entitled to pursue a claim against a municipality in every 
situation where the police fall short of that aspiration.16 
This Note contends that the Court of Appeals erred in 
narrowing the scope of municipal tort liability in Valdez.  Focus 
is on the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of its regressive analysis 
in McLean v. City of New York17 and mistaken reliance upon its 
earlier decision in Cuffy v. City of New York.18  To illustrate the 
7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8 Id. at 73, 960 N.E.2d at 360, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 591. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Valdez v. City of New York, No. 16507/1997, 21 Misc. 3d 1107(A), 2008 WL 
4489934, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 12, 2008), rev’d, 74 A.D.3d 76, 901 
N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st Dep’t 2010), aff’d, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 960 N.E.2d 356, 936 N.Y.S.2d 
587. 
13 Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 81–82, 960 N.E.2d at 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 81, 960 N.E.2d at 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
16 Id. at 84, 960 N.E.2d at 368, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 599. 
17 12 N.Y.3d 194, 905 N.E.2d 1167, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2009). 
18 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987). 
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Court of Appeals’ unwavering adherence to Valdez, this Note 
examines the court’s decisions in Metz v. State19 and Coleson v. 
City of New York.20  Part I discusses the history and purpose of 
sovereign immunity from tort liability, New York’s waiver 
thereof, and court-imposed limitations upon that waiver.  Part II 
examines Valdez and the lasting repercussions of the decision on 
the area of municipal tort liability.  Part III suggests the 
necessity of legislative action, through which the injustice 
perpetuated by the Court of Appeals can be comprehensively 
rectified. 
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
A. History and Purpose of Sovereign Immunity from Liability 
and New York’s Waiver 
The concept of sovereign immunity can best be described as a 
vestige of early common law, with roots in an era in which it was 
firmly believed that “the King c[ould] do no wrong.”21  The 
rationale for maintaining sovereign immunity in the modern era, 
however, is “the principle which holds that it is better for the 
individual to suffer than for the public to be inconvenienced.”22  
The right of each state to raise the defense of sovereign immunity 
is preserved by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.23  Despite the broad grant of immunity contained 
within the Constitution, each state retains the right to “assert, 
waive, or condition [its immunity from suit] at will.”24  If a state 
chooses to waive its immunity from liability, such waiver “must 
be clearly expressed.”25 
19 20 N.Y.3d 175, 982 N.E.2d 76, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2012). 
20 24 N.Y.3d 476, 24 N.E.3d 1074, 999 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2014). 
21 Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 179, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1133, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 
227 (1996); see also Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 68, 186 N.E. 203, 205 (1933) (citing 
Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 204, 163 N.E. 732, 734 (1928); Maxmilian 
v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160, 164 (1875)). 
22 62 N.Y. JUR.2D Government Tort Liability § 1 (2010). 
23 The pertinent text reads, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
24 Easley v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374, 376, 135 N.E.2d 572, 573, 
153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1956) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Trs., 303 N.Y. 484, 489, 104 
N.E.2d 866, 868 (1952)). 
25 Maloney v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 356, 359, 144 N.E.2d 364, 365, 165 N.Y.S.2d 465, 
467 (1957) (citing Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 403, 24 N.E.2d 97, 100 (1939); 
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The State of New York “clearly expressed”26 its waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Court of Claims Act.27  Through the 
Act, the State waived immunity from liability and consented to 
have its liability “determined in accordance with the same rules 
of law as appl[y] to actions in the supreme court against 
individuals or corporations.”28  Following the enactment of the 
Act, the Court of Appeals proclaimed that the State would no 
longer “use the mantle of sovereignty to protect itself from such 
consequences as follow negligent acts of individuals.”29  The court 
did not view this waiver by the State as an act of magnanimity, 
but, rather, as “a recognition and acknowledgment of a moral 
duty demanded by the principles of equity and justice.”30 
B. Court-Imposed Limitations on New York’s Waiver of 
Sovereign Immunity 
Limitations have accompanied New York’s waiver of 
immunity since it was first declared in the Court of Claims Act.  
An initial limitation is contained within the language of the 
Court of Claims Act itself, in which waiver is conditioned on the 
claimant’s compliance “with the limitations of this article.”31  
However, additional limitations have come from the judiciary.  
The Court of Appeals’ rationale for imposing immunity where the 
legislature ostensibly has waived it derives, to a great extent, 
from the court’s fear of imposing “potentially limitless liability” 
upon the State and thereby depleting state treasury funds 
through tort litigation.32  This Note focuses on two critical 
limitations: the distinction between a public duty, where there 
can be no liability, and a private undertaking, where there may  
 
 
Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405, 410, 125 N.E. 841, 842 (1920), superseded by statute, 
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 2015)). 
26 Id. at 359, 144 N.E.2d at 365, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 467. 
27 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8. 
28 Id. 
29 Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933). 
30 Id. at 138, 184 N.E. at 736. 
31 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8. For example, section 9 of the Act provides that actions 
against the State must be brought in the Court of Claims and section 12 makes clear 
that actions brought in the Court of Claims are to be tried without a jury. See id. 
§§ 9, 12. See generally id. §§ 8-A–12 (detailing limitations upon the State’s waiver). 
32 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061, 
727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 (2001). 
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be liability, and the distinction between acts that are 
discretionary, where there can be no liability, and acts that are 
ministerial, where there may be liability. 
1. Public Duty or Private Undertaking? 
One of the earliest court-imposed limitations upon the 
waiver of sovereign immunity consists of the distinction between 
a public duty and a private undertaking.33  The Court of Appeals 
ruled on the basis of this distinction as early as 1945, in Steitz v. 
City of Beacon.34  In Steitz, a flow control valve located near the 
plaintiffs’ property, which the City of Beacon had neglected to 
keep in good repair, failed to supply an adequate amount of 
water pressure to extinguish a fire on the property.35  The 
plaintiffs sought to hold the city liable for damages to their 
property based on section 24 of the city’s charter, which stated 
that the city would “construct and operate a system of 
waterworks” and “maintain fire . . . departments.”36  Rather than 
holding the city liable, the Court of Appeals instead 
distinguished between the public duties that the city had 
undertaken through its charter and any duty allegedly owed to 
the plaintiffs in an individual capacity.37  Because the city’s 
charter created only a public duty to maintain a fire department, 
the court did not hold the city liable for damages suffered by the 
plaintiffs.38 
Although the line drawn by the Court of Appeals between 
public duty and private undertaking produced criticism and 
inequitable results for the negligently injured plaintiff,39 the 
court reaffirmed the distinction in O’Connor v. City of New 
33 See generally Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., Municipal Liability Through a Judge’s 
Eyes, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925 (1993) (discussing the origin and development of the 
distinction). 
34 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945). 
35 Id. at 54, 64 N.E.2d at 705. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 55, 64 N.E.2d at 706. 
38 Id. at 57, 64 N.E.2d at 707. 
39 See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968) (holding that the city was not liable for serious injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff following the police department’s refusal to protect her from 
a rejected suitor); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 141, 204 N.E.2d 
635, 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 600 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting) (“[M]unicipal 
nonliability for injury-causing breaches of duty is archaic and unjust.”). 
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York.40  There, a city inspector’s negligent failure to observe 
defects in a newly installed gas system, or to insist upon their 
correction, led to the deaths of twelve people, injury to many 
others, and the complete destruction of a commercial building.41  
The court acknowledged the “substantial hardship” that 
individuals will suffer “as a result of their inability to recover for 
their injuries from a municipality that negligently fails to enforce 
its own regulations.”42  However, the court found that this 
potential hardship was outweighed by “[t]he deleterious impact 
that such a judicial extension of liability would have on local 
governments, the vital functions that they serve, and ultimately 
on taxpayers.”43  Although it acknowledged the city inspector’s 
negligence, the court held that the gas piping regulations were 
intended to “benefit the plaintiffs as members of the 
community, . . . not [to] create a duty to the plaintiffs as 
individuals.”44 
2. The Governmental Function Immunity Defense: 
Discretionary or Ministerial Action? 
Since the nineteenth century, the Court of Appeals has 
referred to a distinction between acts that are quasi-judicial, or 
discretionary, in nature and acts that are ministerial.45  Despite a 
brief lull in the wake of the Court of Claims Act, the distinction 
reemerged in 1960.  In Weiss v. Fote,46 the court held that where 
the State had waived its sovereign immunity prior to the 
enactment of the Court of Claims Act, the scope of liability so 
assumed could not be broadened by the Act.47  The decision was 
“a long and surprising step backward into the old, abandoned 
area of governmental immunity.”48  However, the judiciary 
continued to maintain this vestige of sovereign immunity due to 
its reluctance to “second-guess” the government’s “discretionary 
40 58 N.Y.2d 184, 192, 447 N.E.2d 33, 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (1983). 
41 Id. at 187–89, 447 N.E.2d at 33–34, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 485–86. 
42 Id. at 192, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 191, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488. 
45 See, e.g., Urquhart v. City of Ogdensburg, 91 N.Y. 67, 71 (1883) 
(distinguishing discretionary acts from the ministerial duties that arise once such 
discretion has been exercised). 
46 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960). 
47 Id. at 585, 167 N.E.2d at 65, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 412–13. 
48 Id. at 589, 167 N.E.2d at 68, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). 
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decisions on how to best allocate limited public resources for the 
provision of public services.”49  It wants to avoid hampering the 
free exercise of judgment and discretion by government 
employees, whose decision-making abilities might be impaired by 
fear of retaliatory lawsuits.50 
The Court of Appeals attempted to enunciate a clear 
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts in Tango 
v. Tulevech.51  Mr. Tango, the plaintiff, had divorced the mother 
of his two daughters, Ms. Childs, in 1974.52  Originally, Childs 
retained permanent custody of their daughters.53  In 1977, 
however, the two voluntarily entered into a new custody 
arrangement whereby Tango would have exclusive custody of 
their daughters for a year.54  When he commenced a proceeding 
seeking to have this modified custody arrangement made 
permanent, Childs went to her daughters’ school, removed them 
from their school bus, and drove away with them.55  The school’s 
principal alerted local police of the incident, and they were able 
to intercept Childs’s vehicle.56  Childs and her daughters were 
taken to the In-take Unit of the Rockland County Family Court’s 
Probation Department, where she presented the department 
supervisor, Ms. Tulevech, with the original divorce decree 
awarding Childs custody.57  Tango arrived at the courthouse and 
informed Tulevech of Childs’s physical abuse of his daughters.58  
Despite this information, Tulevech released the girls into Childs’s 
custody.59  After Tango regained custody of his daughters, he 
brought an action for damages against Tulevech and the County 
of Rockland for endangering his daughters’ welfare.60 
 
49 Michael G. Bersani, The “Governmental Function Immunity” Defense in 
Personal Injury Cases in the Post-McLean World, N.Y. ST. B.J., June 2013, at 37. 
50 See Haddock v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 553 N.E.2d 987, 991, 
554 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (1990). 
51 61 N.Y.2d 34, 459 N.E.2d 182, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1983). 
52 Id. at 37, 459 N.E.2d at 184, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 75. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 38, 459 N.E.2d at 184, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 75. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 38–39, 459 N.E.2d at 184, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 75. 
60 Id. at 39, 459 N.E.2d at 184, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 75. 
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Although Tango prevailed at trial, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of his complaint 
under the governmental function immunity defense.61  In its 
analysis, the court attempted to harmonize an array of previous 
inconsistent decisions concerning the distinction between 
discretionary and ministerial acts.62  The court explained that 
discretionary acts are those “involv[ing] the exercise of reasoned 
judgment which could typically produce different acceptable 
results,” while ministerial acts are those involving “direct 
adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory 
result.”63  Where an official action is discretionary, a municipality 
will not be held “liable for the injurious consequences of that 
action.”64  In contrast, where an official act is ministerial, a 
municipality may be held liable for any harm so caused “if it is 
otherwise tortious and not justifiable pursuant to statutory 
command.”65  The court emphasized the need for case-by-case 
analysis, instructing courts to look to the context in which the 
action arose, the nature of the duty to be fulfilled, and the actor’s 
responsibility and position within the municipality.66  Thus, 
because Tulevech had acted within the scope of her discretionary 
authority as supervisor of the In-take Unit of the Probation 
Department, neither she nor the County of Rockland could be 
held liable for her errors in judgment.67 
The court expanded the governmental function immunity 
defense even further in Lauer v. City of New York.68  There, Mr. 
Lauer’s three-year-old son died suddenly.69  After an autopsy, the 
city’s medical examiner issued a death certificate stating that the 
child’s death was the result of a homicide, spawning a murder 
investigation focused primarily on the father.70  Although a more 
detailed study revealed that the child had died of a ruptured  
 
 
61 Id. at 43, 459 N.E.2d at 187, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 78. 
62 See id. at 40–41, 459 N.E.2d at 185–86, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 76–77. 
63 Id. at 41, 459 N.E.2d at 186, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 77. 
64 Id. at 40, 459 N.E.2d at 185, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 76. 
65 Id. (citing E. River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N.Y. 557, 559 (1883)). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 41–42, 459 N.E.2d at 186, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 77. 
68 95 N.Y.2d 95, 733 N.E.2d 184, 711 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2000). 
69 Id. at 97, 733 N.E.2d at 186, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 114. 
70 Id. at 98, 733 N.E.2d at 186, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 114. 
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brain aneurysm, the medical examiner did not correct the 
autopsy report or death certificate, and he did not notify law 
enforcement authorities.71 
Lauer sued the city for “both negligent and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”72  The Court of Appeals found it 
indisputable that the medical examiner’s failure to correct the 
autopsy report and death certificate was ministerial in nature.73  
The court reiterated its prior analysis in Tango, adding that 
where there has been a breach of a ministerial duty, the plaintiff 
still must prove that there was “a duty running directly to the 
injured person.”74  Because Lauer could not “point to a duty owed 
to him by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner,” the court 
held that he could not recover damages from the city or its 
actors.75 
Despite its restrictive holdings in Tango and Lauer, the court 
later appeared to adopt a more plaintiff-friendly approach.  In 
Pelaez v. Seide,76 it restated that “[a] public employee’s 
discretionary acts . . . may not result in the municipality’s 
liability even when the conduct is negligent.”77  However, the 
court immediately noted that a municipality can still be held 
liable in such cases where “a duty . . . runs from the municipality 
to the plaintiff.”78  The court clarified this exception to the 
governmental function immunity defense in Kovit v. Estate of 
Hallums.79  There, the court stated that, under Pelaez, 
municipalities will not be held liable for discretionary acts 
“except when plaintiffs establish a ‘special relationship’ with the 
municipality.”80  Therefore, under the approach articulated in 
71 Id. 
72 Id. Lauer also brought this action against the medical examiner who 
performed his son’s autopsy, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, and the 
police department, and the action included claims for defamation and violations of 
Lauer’s civil rights. Id. 
73 Id. at 99, 733 N.E.2d at 187, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 115. 
74 Id. at 99–100, 733 N.E.2d at 187, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 115. 
75 Id. at 101, 733 N.E.2d at 188, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 116. 
76 2 N.Y.3d 186, 810 N.E.2d 393, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2004). 
77 Id. at 198, 810 N.E.2d at 399, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 99, 733 N.E.2d 184, 187, 711 
N.Y.S.2d 112, 115 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
78 Id. 
79 4 N.Y.3d 499, 829 N.E.2d 1188, 797 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2005), overruled in part by 
McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 24, 905 N.E.2d 1167, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238 
(2009). 
80 Id. at 505, 829 N.E.2d at 1189, 797 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
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Pelaez and Kovit, a plaintiff injured by a municipality’s tortious 
performance of a discretionary act could recover for injuries by 
establishing “a special relationship between the plaintiff and the 
governmental entity.”81 
The Court of Appeals has articulated how a special 
relationship between a municipality and an individual citizen 
can be formed: 
A special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the 
municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of 
a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a 
duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who 
benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes 
positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant 
and dangerous safety violation.82 
A claim cannot be asserted on either of the first two bases unless 
the plaintiff satisfies certain elements.83  To establish a violation 
of a statutory duty, a plaintiff must prove the following:  
“(1) [T]he plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit 
the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of 
action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing 
statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative 
scheme.”84  To establish a special relationship under the second 
basis, voluntary assumption of a duty, a plaintiff must prove four 
elements: 
The elements of this “special relationship” are: (1) an 
assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of 
an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was 
injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents 
that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact 
between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and 
(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s 
affirmative undertaking.85   
81 Pelaez, 2 N.Y.3d at 198–99, 810 N.E.2d at 399, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see also 
Kovit, 4 N.Y.3d at 505, 829 N.E.2d at 1189, 797 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
82 Pelaez, 2 N.Y.3d at 199–200, 810 N.E.2d at 400, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (citing 
Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253, 261–62, 447 N.E.2d 717, 721, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (1983)). 
83 See id. at 200–02, 810 N.E.2d at 400–01, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 118–19. 
84 Id. (citation omitted) (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 
629, 633, 541 N.E.2d 18, 20, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1989)). 
85 Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940, 513 
N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987) (citing Shinder v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 945, 946, 468 N.E.2d 27, 
27, 479 N.Y.S.2d 189, 189 (1984)); see also De Long v. Cnty. of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 
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A plaintiff’s failure to establish each element, in either scenario, 
will result in the plaintiff’s inability to recover damages from the 
municipality. 
While Pelaez and Kovit would have limited the necessity of 
such proof to cases involving discretionary acts by the 
municipality, the Court of Appeals took a radically different 
approach in McLean v. City of New York.86  Ms. McLean’s 
daughter suffered a brain injury while in the care of Ms. 
Theroulde, who ran a “family day care home” registered by the 
New York City Department of Health87 (“DOH”).  McLean 
brought an action against the city, asserting that the city should 
be held liable for her daughter’s injuries because the DOH had 
permitted Theroulde’s registration to be renewed following 
substantiated complaints concerning her home.88  The court 
found that McLean had failed to prove the existence of a “special 
relationship” between the city and her daughter.89  However, 
McLean argued that the establishment of a “special relationship” 
is not necessary unless a municipality’s actions are 
discretionary.90 
Rather than accepting McLean’s argument, a ruling that 
would have been in accordance with its recent decisions in Pelaez 
and Kovit, the Court of Appeals chose instead to limit the scope of 
municipal tort liability drastically.  The court compared its past 
holdings in Tango and Lauer to its more recent holdings in Pelaez  
 
305, 457 N.E.2d 717, 721, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 616 (1983) (“If conduct has gone 
forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely 
in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists 
a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.” (quoting H.R. Moch Co. v. 
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 
534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (finding that a special relationship exists where police 
fail to adequately protect an individual who supplies information leading directly to 
a widely publicized arrest and who was killed in retaliation). 
86 12 N.Y.3d 194, 905 N.E.2d 1167, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2009). 
87 Id. at 197–99, 905 N.E.2d at 1169–70, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 240–41 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
88 Id. at 198–99, 905 N.E.2d at 1170–71, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 241–42. The 
Administration for Children’s Services cannot renew the registration of a family day 
care home unless it has received no complaints about the home or, having received 
complaints, has determined that the home is being “operated in compliance with 
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 390 
(2)(d)(ii)(B)(4) (McKinney 2015). 
89 McLean, 12 N.Y.3d at 202, 905 N.E.2d at 1173, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 244. 
90 Id. 
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and Kovit.91  The court chose to resolve the inconsistency between 
the two sets of cases in favor of the less forgiving alternative.  In 
the words of the court:  
Tango and Lauer are right, and any contrary inference that may 
be drawn from . . . Pelaez and Kovit is wrong.  Government 
action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while 
ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special 
duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in 
general.92   
Thus, the court found that the city could not be held liable for 
McLean’s daughter’s injuries, regardless of whether the city’s 
actions had been discretionary or ministerial, because McLean 
had failed to establish the existence of a special relationship 
between her daughter and the city.93 
II. VALDEZ V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
McLean made clear the court’s new rule regarding the 
governmental function immunity defense:  Where a municipal act 
is discretionary, it can never be a basis for liability to an 
individual, and where a municipal act is ministerial, it can only 
be a basis for liability to an individual if the individual 
establishes the existence of a special relationship.94  However, the 
court in Valdez further altered the scope of municipal tort 
liability in two distinct and critical ways.95  First, Valdez made 
clear that under McLean, the special duty doctrine is no longer 
an exception to the governmental function immunity defense.96  
Second, where a plaintiff seeks to prove the existence of a special 
relationship formed by the voluntary assumption of a duty, “a 
promise by police that certain action will be forthcoming within a 
specified time period generally will not justify reliance long after 
a reasonable time period has passed without any indication that 
the action has occurred.”97 
 
91 Id. at 202–03, 905 N.E.2d at 1173–74, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 244–45. 
92 Id. at 203, 905 N.E.2d at 1173–74, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 244–45. 
93 Id. at 203, 905 N.E.2d at 1174, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 245. 
94 See id. at 203, 905 N.E.2d at 1173–74, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 244–45. 
95  Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 960 N.E.2d 356, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587 
(2011). 
96 See id. at 80, 960 N.E.2d at 365, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
97 Id. at 82, 960 N.E.2d at 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
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A. The Eradication of the Special Duty Doctrine as an Exception 
to the Governmental Function Immunity Defense 
Following Valdez, the special duty doctrine is no longer an 
exception to the otherwise impenetrable protection afforded a 
municipality by the governmental function immunity defense.98  
The Valdez court declared that the establishment of a special 
relationship is the “threshold burden” that a plaintiff must 
overcome before liability will be imposed upon a municipality for 
its ministerial functions.99  The court’s analysis in such cases now 
consists primarily of a determination concerning the satisfaction 
of this “threshold burden.”100  Where a plaintiff is unable to 
establish the existence of a special relationship, the distinction 
between discretionary and ministerial acts becomes irrelevant, 
for the court will refuse to impose liability upon the 
municipality.101  Only when a plaintiff has established the 
existence of a special relationship will the court proceed to 
determine whether the action falls within the governmental 
function immunity defense.102  Although the special duty doctrine 
originally permitted plaintiffs to hold a municipality liable for 
the tortious conduct of its agents when liability ordinarily would 
not attach, the court transformed the doctrine into an initial 
obstacle plaintiffs must overcome before facing the subsequent 
obstacle posed by the governmental function immunity defense. 
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman’s fervent dissenting opinion 
in Valdez supports the contention that Valdez has dangerously 
narrowed the scope of municipal tort liability.  The Chief Judge 
first acknowledged that, under McLean, governmental immunity 
has become “impregnable where the government conduct sued 
upon involves the exercise of discretion.”103  Based on McLean’s 
interpretation of the governmental function immunity defense, 
the city was correct in asserting that the case could be dismissed 
without addressing the issue of justifiable reliance, as an arrest 
“necessarily entail[s] the exercise of professional judgment and 
98 See John C. Cherundolo, Tort Law, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923, 940 (2013). 
99 Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 80, 960 N.E.2d at 365, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
100 See, e.g., Metz v. State, 20 N.Y.3d 175, 181, 982 N.E.2d 76, 80, 958 N.Y.S.2d 
314, 318 (2012). 
101 See Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 84, 960 N.E.2d at 368, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 599. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. at 90, 960 N.E.2d at 372, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 603 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
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discretion in the manner and timing of its execution.”104  Even if 
Ms. Valdez had proven each element of a special relationship, 
which Lippman believed she had, she would have been “barred 
from recovering because the promised undertaking involved some 
exercise of official discretion.”105 
However, this concession merely served as a platform for 
Chief Judge Lippman’s larger argument that “[t]he special duty 
doctrine was conceived precisely to avoid such an inequitable 
and, frankly, regressive outcome.”106  Lippman explained that the 
special duty doctrine originally had been intended “as an 
extremely narrow and difficult-to-establish exception to the rule 
of nonliability where” an injury-causing action is discretionary in 
nature.107  Lippman considered McLean a “significant departure” 
from preexisting law because, rather than permitting causes of 
action that otherwise would be barred, as was intended, McLean 
limited claims that previously were allowed.108  However, 
Lippman believed that, by reducing the special duty doctrine “to 
a vestige,” Valdez “complete[d] the neutering first announced in 
McLean.”109  Valdez, in the words of Chief Judge Lippman, 
“effectively tolls the death knell for these actions.”110 
The detrimental impact of Valdez on the future of municipal 
tort liability can be illustrated best by one of the first cases to 
reach the Court of Appeals in its wake, Metz v. State.111  In Metz, 
a tour boat capsized on Lake George, killing twenty passengers 
and injuring several others.112  Because the tour boat, the Ethan 
Allen, was a public vessel, it fell within New York’s regulatory 
powers over the use of public vessels under New York’s 
Navigation Law.113  Under that statute, the owner of a public 
vessel who intends to operate the vessel upon state waters must 
notify an inspector of the intention to do so and request an 
inspection of the vessel.114  Thereafter, the vessel is “subject to 
104 Id. at 90–91, 960 N.E.2d at 372–73, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 603–04. 
105 Id. at 91, 960 N.E.2d at 373, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 604. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 91–92, 960 N.E.2d at 373, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 604. 
109 Id. at 93, 960 N.E.2d at 374, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
110 Id. at 92, 960 N.E.2d at 373, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 604. 
111 20 N.Y.3d 175, 982 N.E.2d 76, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2012). 
112 Id. at 177, 982 N.E.2d at 77, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
113 Id. at 177–78, 982 N.E.2d at 77–78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 315–16. 
114 N.Y. NAV. LAW § 50 (McKinney 2015). 
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yearly state inspections, at which an inspector appointed by the 
Commissioner of the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation 
and Historic Preservation (OPRHP) would issue a certificate 
indicating, among other things, the vessel’s maximum passenger 
capacity.”115 
Although the Ethan Allen was carrying forty-seven 
passengers and one crew member when it capsized, which was 
within the forty-eight-passenger maximum indicated in the 
certificate of inspection, it was soon determined that the 
maximum indicated was much higher than what the vessel 
should have been permitted to carry.116  This discrepancy was the 
result of several factors, including “outdated passenger weight 
criteria,” failure to conduct a “stability assessment” following 
significant modifications to the vessel, and a policy of relying on 
the passenger capacity certified the previous year rather than on 
independent inspection.117  Those injured in the capsizing, and 
the personal representatives of the decedents, brought a 
negligence action against the State.118 
Notwithstanding the debate at the trial and appellate levels 
concerning whether the inspections of the Ethan Allen 
constituted discretionary or ministerial acts,119 the Court of 
Appeals refused to address the issue.  As it did in Valdez, the 
court turned first to the issue of whether the claimants had 
established the existence of a special relationship with the 
State.120  Since Metz involved a statutory duty, the claimants 
could only establish the existence of a special relationship if they 
could prove that they were “of the class for whose particular 
benefit the [Navigation Law] was enacted,” that “recognition of a 
private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of 
the [Navigation Law],” and that “to do so would be consistent 
with the legislative scheme.”121  The Court of Appeals, quoting 
115 Metz, 20 N.Y.3d at 177, 982 N.E.2d at 77–78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 315–16. 
116 Id. at 177–78, 982 N.E.2d at 78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 316. 
117 Id. at 178–79, 982 N.E.2d at 78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 316. 
118 Id. at 177–79, 982 N.E.2d at 77–78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 315–16. 
119 See generally Metz v. State, No. 113310, 27 Misc. 3d 1209(A), 2010 WL 
1463139 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 4, 2010), aff’d, 86 A.D.3d 748, 927 N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dep’t 
2011), rev’d, 20 N.Y.3d 175, 982 N.E.2d 76, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2012); Metz v. State, 
86 A.D.3d 748, 927 N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dep’t 2011), rev’d, 20 N.Y.3d 175, 982 N.E.2d 
76, 958 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2012). 
120 Metz, 20 N.Y.3d at 179, 982 N.E.2d at 79, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 317. 
121 Pelaez v. Seide, 2 N.Y.3d 186, 200, 810 N.E.2d 393, 400, 778 N.Y.S.2d 111, 
118 (2004), overruled in part by McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 24, 905 
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O’Connor, held that the Navigation Law was intended for the 
benefit of those injured only “in the broad sense of protecting all 
members of the general public similarly situated.”122  Further, 
“recognizing a private right of action would be incompatible with 
the legislative design” because the Navigation Law provides only 
for fines and criminal penalties against owners of vessels, rather 
than for municipal tort liability.123  Because the claimants had 
failed to establish that the State owed them a special duty, the 
court would not hold the State liable for the Office of Parks, 
Recreation and Historic Preservation’s negligence and “the 
victims of this disastrous wreck [were] essentially left without an 
adequate remedy.”124 
Before Valdez and McLean, the claimants in Metz would first 
have had the opportunity to contend that the actions of the 
inspector had been ministerial.  If the claimants had succeeded 
in this argument, the State likely would have been held liable for 
the injuries caused by the inspector’s negligence in certifying a 
maximum passenger capacity without performing the requisite 
inspections.125  However, under Valdez and McLean, the debate 
over whether the inspections were ministerial or discretionary 
became inconsequential when the claimants failed to prove the 
existence of a special relationship with the State.126  Those 
injured in the capsizing, and those representing their deceased 
loved ones, were left without recourse.127 
B. The Insurmountable Burden of Proving Justifiable Reliance 
In addition to amplifying the significance of the special duty 
doctrine, the Valdez court increased the burden that a plaintiff 
must satisfy in order to establish a special relationship on the 
basis of a voluntary assumption of a duty.  Valdez involved  
 
 
N.E.2d 1167, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2009) (citing Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 73 
N.Y.2d 629, 633, 541 N.E.2d 18, 20, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1989)). 
122 Metz, 20 N.Y.3d at 180, 982 N.E.2d at 80, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 318 (quoting 
O’Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 190, 447 N.E.2d 33, 35, 460 N.Y.S.2d 
485, 487 (1983)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
123 Id. at 180–81, 982 N.E.2d at 80, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 318. 
124 Id. at 180–81, 982 N.E.2d at 79–80, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 317–18. 
125 See id. at 178, 982 N.E.2d at 78, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 316. 
126 Id. at 180, 982 N.E.2d at 79, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 317. 
127 Id. at 181, 982 N.E.2d at 80, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 318. 
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Officer Torres’s voluntary assumption of a duty to arrest Perez, 
Ms. Valdez’s ex-boyfriend, “immediately.”128  Therefore, in order 
to prove the existence of a special relationship, the court stated:  
The elements [Ms. Valdez would have to prove] are: (1) an 
assumption by the [city], through promises or actions, of an 
affirmative duty to act on behalf of [Ms. Valdez]; (2) knowledge 
on the part of the [officers of the Domestic Violence Unit] that 
inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact 
between the [officers of the Domestic Violence Unit] and [Ms. 
Valdez]; and (4) [Ms. Valdez]’s justifiable reliance on the [city]’s 
affirmative undertaking.129   
Valdez contains limited reference to the first three elements of a 
special relationship, focusing instead on the fourth element of 
justifiable reliance.130  The court described justifiable reliance as 
a “ ‘critical’ [factor] because it ‘provides the essential causative 
link between the special duty assumed by the municipality and 
the alleged injury.’ ”131 
The court found that Ms. Valdez had failed to establish the 
existence of a special relationship with the city because “[i]t was 
not reasonable for [her] to conclude, based on nothing more than 
[Officer Torres’s] statement that the police were going to arrest 
Perez ‘immediately,’ that she could relax her vigilance 
indefinitely.”132  Since Ms. Valdez had not communicated any 
information concerning Perez’s whereabouts to the police, “it 
would not have been reasonable for [her] to have relied on the 
police promise to arrest Perez ‘immediately’ in a literal sense 
since his location had to be discovered.”133  Further, because Ms. 
Valdez testified that she expected to receive a call from Officer 
Torres confirming the arrest, and had not received any such call 
at the time of her attack, the court found it “difficult to reconcile 
her contention that she was nonetheless justified in relaxing her 
vigilance when more than a day passed with no word of the 
128 Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 73, 960 N.E.2d 356, 359, 936 
N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940, 513 
N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987) (citing Shinder v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 945, 946, 468 N.E.2d 27, 
27, 479 N.Y.S.2d 189, 189 (1984)). 
130 See Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 80–81, 960 N.E.2d at 365, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
131 Id. at 81, 960 N.E.2d at 365, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (quoting Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d 
at 261, 505 N.E.2d at 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 375). 
132 Id. at 81, 960 N.E.2d at 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
133 Id. 
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expected arrest.”134  However, in what at first glance appears to 
be an innocuous restatement of law, the court imposed an 
additional obstacle that a plaintiff must overcome in order to 
prove justifiable reliance.  According to the court, “[a]s is evident 
from the analysis in Cuffy, a promise by police that certain action 
will be forthcoming within a specified time period generally will 
not justify reliance long after a reasonable time period has 
passed without any indication that the action has occurred.”135 
In Cuffy v. City of New York, Joseph and Eleanor Cuffy 
owned a two-family house, the ground floor of which they leased 
to Joel and Barbara Aitkins while they and their son occupied 
the upper floor.136  The Cuffys and the Aitkins had a hostile 
relationship and required police intervention on numerous 
occasions.137  Following an incident in which Mr. Aitkins 
physically attacked Mrs. Cuffy, Mr. Cuffy sought police 
protection for his family.138  The lieutenant at the police precinct 
told Mr. Cuffy not to worry and that “an arrest would be made or 
something else would be done about the situation ‘first thing in 
the morning.’ ”139  The police failed to take any further action, 
and the following evening, the Cuffys were attacked by both Mr. 
and Mrs. Aitkins.140  The Cuffy family sustained serious injuries 
as a result of the attack.141 
The court rejected the Cuffys’ claims against the city because 
the Cuffys failed to establish each of the four elements of a 
special relationship.142  The court held that the Cuffys had not 
justifiably relied upon the lieutenant’s promise that “[Mr.] 
Aitkins would be arrested or something else would be done ‘first 
thing in the morning’ ” because, by the next day, the Cuffys 
“knew or should have known . . . that the promised police action 
would not be forthcoming.”143  Therefore, despite the court’s  
 
 
134 Id. at 82, 960 N.E.2d at 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
135 Id. 
136 Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 939, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 259, 505 N.E.2d at 939, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 374. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 259–60, 505 N.E.2d at 939, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 374. 
142 Id. at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 938, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373. 
143 Id. at 263, 505 N.E.2d at 941–42, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
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recognition that “[i]t may well be that the police were negligent 
in misjudging the seriousness of the threat to the Cuffys,” the 
court rejected the Cuffys’ claims for their injuries.144 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ later statement in Valdez, 
the holding in Cuffy does not make it “evident” that “a promise 
by police that certain action will be forthcoming within a 
specified time period generally will not justify reliance long after 
a reasonable time period has passed without any indication that 
the action has occurred.”145  In Cuffy, the plaintiffs lived in the 
same house as their attackers.146  Mrs. Cuffy’s own testimony 
indicated “that she had periodically looked out her front window 
throughout the day of the incident and had not seen any police 
cars pull up in front of her house.”147  The court based its decision 
concerning the Cuffys’ justifiable reliance on the plaintiffs’ own 
testimony that they were aware that the police had not arrested 
or restrained Mr. Aitkins by the time promised.148  Any evidence 
that the court intended to make the general pronouncement 
attributed to it in Valdez is conspicuously absent.149 
In his dissenting opinion in Valdez, Chief Judge Lippman 
claimed that the majority’s analysis of justifiable reliance was 
based on a misinterpretation or overextension of the opinion in 
Cuffy.150  According to the Chief Judge:  
[A]ll Cuffy establishes is that knowledge that the police have 
not acted in accordance with an assurance will defeat a claim of 
reasonable reliance on the assurance; it does not stand for the 
very different proposition . . . that absent objective confirmation 
that the police have made good upon a promise of protection 
their promise may not be reasonably relied on.151 
Chief Judge Lippman distinguished Cuffy from Valdez, 
indicating that, “unlike the Cuffy plaintiffs, [Ms. Valdez] was not 
in a position visually to confirm whether the promised arrest had 
been made.”152  Lippman was of the opinion “that the jury could 
144 Id. at 264, 505 N.E.2d at 942, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 377. 
145 Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 82, 960 N.E.2d 356, 366, 936 
N.Y.S.2d 587, 597 (2011). 
146 Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 939, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373. 
147 Id. at 263, 505 N.E.2d at 941, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
148 Id. at 263, 505 N.E.2d at 942, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 376. 
149 See generally Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372. 
150 See Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 86–87, 960 N.E.2d at 369–70, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 600–
01 (2011) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 86, 960 N.E.2d at 369, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 600. 
152 Id. 
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have reasonably concluded that Ms. Valdez justifiably relied 
upon Officer Torres and the Domestic Violence Unit 
expeditiously to arrest Perez, or, failing the attainment of that 
objective, to advise her that the promised action had not been 
taken and that Perez remained at large.”153  The majority’s 
holding that Ms. Valdez was unreasonable in relying on Officer 
Torres’s promise based solely on the passage of time is, according 
to Lippman, both “incorrect” and “from an equitable and policy 
perspective devastatingly wrong.”154  The Court of Appeals had 
“raise[d] the reasonable reliance bar to a practically 
insurmountable height by holding, as a matter of law, that a 
plaintiff may not justifiably rely upon government to do both 
what it has specifically promised and what it must under the 
law.”155 
The Court of Appeals has made clear that it does not intend 
to modify the reinterpretation of “justifiable reliance” set forth in 
Valdez.156  In Coleson v. City of New York, Mrs. Coleson had 
suffered verbal and physical abuse at the hands of her husband 
since 2000.157  In May 2004, she told Mr. Coleson to leave their 
apartment because of his drug abuse.158  On June 23, 2004, Mrs. 
Coleson requested police assistance when Mr. Coleson returned 
to their apartment and attempted to stab her with a 
screwdriver.159  The police informed Mrs. Coleson that her 
husband had been arrested.160  An officer told Mrs. Coleson that 
her husband was “going to be in prison for a while, [and that she 
should not] worry, [she] was going to be given protection.”161  
Later that evening, another officer told Mrs. Coleson that Mr. 
Coleson was before a judge for sentencing and that “everything 
was in process.”162  The next day, Mr. Coleson was released on his 
153 Id. at 87, 960 N.E.2d at 370, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
154 Id. at 88, 960 N.E.2d at 371, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
155 Id. at 92, 960 N.E.2d at 374, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
156 See id. at at 84, 960 N.E.2d 368, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 599. 
157 Coleson v. City of New York (Coleson II), 24 N.Y.3d 476, 479, 24 N.E.3d 1074, 
1075, 999 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (2014). 
158 Id. at 479, 24 N.E.3d at 1076, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 812. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (alteration in original). 
162 Id. (ellipsis omitted). 
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own recognizance following arraignment.163  Unaware of her 
husband’s release, Mrs. Coleson went to pick up her seven-year-
old son from school, where Mr. Coleson stabbed her in her son’s 
presence.164  The Appellate Division, in accordance with Valdez, 
found that the city owed no special duty of care to Mrs. Coleson 
or to her son.165  The court found that the statements made by the 
officers concerning Mr. Coleson’s arrest were “too vague to 
constitute promises giving rise to a duty of care” and granted 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.166  Mrs. Coleson 
appealed this harsh result,167 presenting the Court of Appeals 
with the opportunity to undo the steps it had taken toward 
making “justifiable reliance” a nearly insurmountable burden for 
a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable in tort. 
The Court of Appeals rejected this opportunity.  Rather than 
modify the rule set forth in Valdez, a rule that has proven both 
difficult to apply and, as was demonstrated in Metz v. State, 
unjust in its application,168 the court merely distinguished the 
facts in Valdez from the facts in Coleson.169  According to the 
court, “[t]he conduct of the police [in Coleson] was more 
substantial, involved, and interactive than the police conduct in 
Valdez.”170  The court opined that the police officer’s statement 
“that Coleson was going to be in prison for a while” was so much 
less “vague” than the statement in Valdez that Perez would be 
arrested “immediately” that the former could create “justifiable 
reliance” while the latter could not.171  The court therefore held 
that Mrs. Coleson “raised a triable issue of fact” regarding the 
existence of a special relationship.172  The holdings in Valdez and 
Coleson are difficult to harmonize and are likely to cause 
confusion for lower courts that seek to apply these decisions.  
163 Coleson v. City of New York (Coleson I), 106 A.D.3d 474, 476, 964 N.Y.S.2d 
419, 420 (1st Dep’t 2013) (Moskowitz, J., concurring), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 24 
N.Y.3d 476, 24 N.E.2d 1074, 999 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2014). 
164 Coleson II, 24 N.Y.3d at 479, 24 N.E.3d at 1076, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 812. 
165 Coleson I, 106 A.D.3d at 474–75, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (majority opinion). 
166 Id. 
167 See Coleson II, 24 N.Y.3d 476, 24 N.E.3d 1074, 999 N.Y.S.2d 810. 
168 See supra Part II.A. 
169 See Coleson II, 24 N.Y.3d at 482, 24 N.E.3d at 1078, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 814. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 482–83, 24 N.E.3d at 1078–79, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 814–15 (citing Valdez 
v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 81, 960 N.E.2d 356, 366, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 587, 597 
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172 Id. at 483, 24 N.E.3d at 1079, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 815. 
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What Coleson has made clear, however, is that the Court of 
Appeals does not intend to retreat from its holding in Valdez—of 
its own accord. 
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
As is demonstrated by Valdez and its progeny, the Court of 
Appeals has reduced New York State’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity to little more than words on a page.  Even when the 
court has recognized the inequity of its policies and the 
“substantial hardship” that “some individuals will suffer . . . as a 
result of their inability to recover for their injuries,” it has 
consigned to itself a passive role in the belief that “[t]he 
deleterious impact that such a judicial extension of liability 
would have on local governments, the vital functions that they 
serve, and ultimately on taxpayers, . . . demands continued 
adherence to the existing rule.”173  Although “special status 
requirements created by the courts can be abolished by the courts 
when experience has shown they are unworkable and unfair,” the 
court has, in effect, ceded any responsibility to address this 
inequitable situation to the legislature.174 
As a result, the Court of Appeals has stood firm regarding its 
allocation to the legislature of any and all responsibility for 
altering the unavailability of municipal tort liability.  The court’s 
rationale stems from its professed inability to answer “questions 
that require judgments concerning the types of positions and the 
nature of the governmental actions that should receive 
immunity” and to “balanc[e] . . . interests of injured parties 
against the competing financial interests of municipalities.”175  
The court views such endeavors as “foolhardy indeed and an 
assumption of judicial wisdom and power not possessed by the 
courts.”176  Because the ability of a municipality to provide public 
services is limited by the availability of resources, the court says 
that “[d]eployment of these resources [must] remain . . . a 
173 O’Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 192, 447 N.E.2d 33, 36, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (1983). 
174 Id. at 194, 447 N.E.2d at 37, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (Wachtler, J., dissenting) 
(citing Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976)). 
175 Hancock, supra note 33, at 928. 
176 Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 
N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968). 
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legislative-executive decision.”177  The court insists that the 
legislature must determine the scope of municipal tort liability, 
as the legislature is responsible for the provision of governmental 
services and the allocation of public resources.178  The “empirical 
analysis” and “arbitrary line-drawing” called for by the court’s 
recent decisions in Valdez, Metz, and Coleson must, therefore, be 
performed by the legislature.179 
New York would not be the first state to use legislation “to 
balance the inequities perpetrated through the application of 
sovereign immunity with the severe economic burden which total 
abrogation of that doctrine would impose upon public entities.”180  
The State of New Jersey overruled long-existing case law by 
enacting the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, in which the New 
Jersey legislature provided that “public entitles shall only be 
liable for their negligence within the limitations of th[e] act and 
in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established 
[t]herein.”181  Similarly, the State of California abolished 
judicially declared forms of liability for public entities,182 and the 
State of Illinois replaced the doctrine of sovereign immunity for 
local municipalities,183 through the enactment of legislation.  The 
scope of New York’s legislation would differ from that of New 
Jersey, California, and Illinois, since the limitations upon New 
York’s waiver of immunity are what have become unworkable, 
rather than the waiver itself.  However, the way has been paved 
for New York to enact legislation that comprehensively rectifies 
nearly a century of increasingly broad and judicially imposed 
limitations upon the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 
First, the legislature must undo the rule in McLean 
concerning the application of the special duty doctrine.  As Chief 
Judge Lippman expounded in his dissent in Valdez, the special 
duty doctrine was intended as “an extremely narrow and 
difficult-to-establish exception to the rule of nonliability where 
177 Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 198, 375 N.E.2d 763, 768, 404 N.Y.S.2d 
583, 588 (1978). 
178 See O’Connor, 58 N.Y.2d at 192, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488. 
179 Hancock, supra note 33, at 928. 
180 Cancel v. Watson, 329 A.2d 596, 597 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), 
overruled on other grounds by D’Annunzio v. Borough of Wildwood Crest, 410 A.D.2d 
1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). 
181 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (West 2015). 
182 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815 (West 2014). 
183 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-103–10/2-109 (West 2014). 
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discretionary government conduct was alleged to have resulted in 
injury[,] . . . permit[ting] otherwise barred causes [of 
action] . . . in relation to claims based on discretionary acts.”184  
The legislature must set forth a rule clearly stating that the 
special duty doctrine is an exception only in cases involving the 
discretionary acts of municipal agents, in keeping with the 
special duty doctrine’s original intention.  Municipal liability for 
negligently performed ministerial acts should be based simply on 
traditional tort principles. 
Second, the legislature must set out a new rule concerning 
the formation of a special relationship, particularly in the case of 
a voluntary assumption of a duty.  Although the four elements of 
such a special relationship185 have not, in themselves, proved 
overly burdensome, the Court of Appeals’ current interpretation 
of the fourth element of justifiable reliance is so arbitrary in 
application as to be unworkable.186  Rather than permit the 
nearly “insurmountable” burden erected by the court in Valdez to 
stand, 187 the legislature should redefine “justifiable reliance” in a 
way that acknowledges the beliefs typically held by a reasonable 
municipal citizen, rather than what the court alone deems 
justifiable.  No single factor should be determinative in the case 
of justifiable reliance, as what is justifiable will differ according 
to the circumstances of each case.  Therefore, justifiable reliance 
should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable 
municipal citizen in the plaintiff’s circumstances. 
 
184 Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 91, 960 N.E.2d 356, 373, 936 
N.Y.S.2d 587, 604 (2011) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting); see supra Part II.A. 
185 The court in Cuffy v. City of New York articulated four elements: 
The elements of this “special relationship” are: (1) an assumption by the 
municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on 
behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the 
municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of 
direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and 
(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative 
undertaking. 
69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1987) (citing 
Shinder v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 945, 946, 468 N.E.2d 27, 27, 479 N.Y.S.2d 189, 189 
(1984)). 
186 See, e.g., Coleson v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 476, 24 N.E.3d 1074, 999 
N.Y.S.2d 810 (2014). 
187 Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 92, 960 N.E.2d at 374, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (Lippman, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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An additional legislative action, suggested by Judge 
Theodore Jones in his dissenting opinion in Valdez, is the 
creation of an exception to the governmental function immunity 
defense when a municipality “negligent[ly] fail[s] to provide 
police protection.”188  The exception would arise only in the 
narrow set of circumstances “where a promise of protection was 
made to a particular citizen and, as a consequence, a ‘special 
duty’ to that citizen arose.”189  Such an exception “is supported by 
a long line of decisions concerning the narrowly-recognized claim 
against a municipality ‘for its negligent failure to provide police 
protection.’ ”190  The legislature could, therefore, set forth a rule 
definitively excluding the distinction between discretionary and 
ministerial acts in cases where a promise of police protection is 
made to an individual citizen.  It is in more than a “colloquial 
sense” that citizens of a municipality “should be able to depend 
on the police to do what they say they are going to do.”191  Where 
the police have promised to provide protection to an individual 
citizen, a special duty to that citizen should arise regardless of 
whether the subsequent police action is discretionary or 
ministerial. 
CONCLUSION 
In Valdez v. City of New York, the Court of Appeals 
drastically and unnecessarily narrowed the right of a plaintiff to 
hold a municipality liable for injuries caused by the tortious 
conduct of a municipal agent.  Although the State of New York 
purported to waive its right to sovereign immunity in the Court 
of Claims Act, the Court of Appeals has relegated the Court of 
Claims Act waiver to insignificance through various judicially 
imposed exceptions to and exclusions from that waiver.  Despite 
the inequities brought about as a result of these court-imposed 
limitations, the Court of Appeals has determined that it is the 
responsibility of the New York State legislature, rather than the 
188 Id. at 93, 960 N.E.2d at 375, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (Jones, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 938, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373). 
189 Id. (quoting Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 938, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
190 Id. at 94, 960 N.E.2d at 375, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (quoting Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d 
at 258, 505 N.E.2d at 938, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 373); see, e.g., Schuster v. City of New 
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); De Long v. Cty. of Erie, 
60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983). 
191 Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 84, 960 N.E.2d at 368, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 599. 
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court, to extend the scope of municipal tort liability in a manner 
that will properly account for these injustices.  Thus, it is clear 
that legislation alone can remedy the injustice perpetuated by 
the Court of Appeals and restore the State’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity in those instances where fairness so demands. 
 
